Oh goody. I'm not the only technologist that has been thinking long and hard about the voting machine problem. In fact, it looks like I'm coming in pretty late in the game!

It's cutting it pretty close, but perhaps there could be enough time between now and November 2004 to enable a fair and verifiable election.

Here's some thoughtful background and analysis on electronic voting from Stanford Computer Science and Electrical Engineering Professor David Dill.

This statement is intended be a message from technologists to the rest of the public, the gist of which is: Do not be seduced by the apparent convenience of "touch-screen voting" machines, or the "gee whiz" factor that accompanies flashy new technology. Using these machines is tantamount to handing complete control of vote counting to a private company, with no independent checks or audits. These machines represent a serious threat to democracy. Much better alternatives are available for upgrading voting equipment...

Compared with most technical issues, the basic problems with most "touch screen voting machines" are forehead-slappingly obvious to almost anyone who knows a little bit about computer security. There is strong agreement among those who have studied the problem in-depth, and I believe that almost anyone who looks into the problem a little (or a lot) will come to the same conclusions.

We realize that election equipment must satisfy many requirements, so we are neutral about the nature of the voter-verifiable audit trail, so long as it allows meaningful audits. Anything from fully manual paper ballots to optical scan ballots to touch screen machines that print paper ballots would do, so long as the voter can check the ballot and the (anonymous) ballot goes into a secure ballot box of some kind to be available for manual counting. In the future, there may be other kinds of physical ballots or even cryptographically based audit trails that satisfy the requirements.

Here is the full text of the article in case the link goes bad:

http://verify.stanford.edu/evote.html

Introduction
I (David Dill) am organizing opposition to paperless electronic voting machines by technologists, especially computer science researchers. I have written a resolution, for which I would like to recruit endorsements.

The Resolution on Electronic Voting

This statement is intended be a message from technologists to the rest of the public, the gist of which is: Do not be seduced by the apparent convenience of "touch-screen voting" machines, or the "gee whiz" factor that accompanies flashy new technology. Using these machines is tantamount to handing complete control of vote counting to a private company, with no independent checks or audits. These machines represent a serious threat to democracy. Much better alternatives are available for upgrading voting equipment.

I'm seeking endorsements for the statement by individuals and organizations. Of course, potential endorsers may feel that they don't know enough about the problem, so I have provided some links to further information below. Having devoted a modest amount of study to the problem, I have to concede that it's a little more complex that I thought at first. However, it's not that subtle. Compared with most technical issues, the basic problems with most "touch screen voting machines" are forehead-slappingly obvious to almost anyone who knows a little bit about computer security. There is strong agreement among those who have studied the problem in-depth, and I believe that almost anyone who looks into the problem a little (or a lot) will come to the same conclusions.

We realize that election equipment must satisfy many requirements, so we are neutral about the nature of the voter-verifiable audit trail, so long as it allows meaningful audits. Anything from fully manual paper ballots to optical scan ballots to touch screen machines that print paper ballots would do, so long as the voter can check the ballot and the (anonymous) ballot goes into a secure ballot box of some kind to be available for manual counting. In the future, there may be other kinds of physical ballots or even cryptographically based audit trails that satisfy the requirements.

What you can do to help.
Our biggest problem at this time is making people aware of this problem. Most people haven't a clue that there is even a controversy. They assume that election officials, manufacturers, politicians, or somebody must have made sure that the voting machines are secure. So you can help with this problem:

* Mention it to friends.
* Link to this web site
* Write letters to your local newspaper, talk to the reporters and columnists about the issue.
* Bring it up on mailing lists and web sites where readers may be interested (but please don't spam people!).
* Communicate (by email, phone, fax, or US Mail) with your elected officials at the local, state and federal level to let them know you are concerned about the issue.
* Find out what is going on in your community and/or state. Are they planning to buy new machines? To find out more, see our web pages about what's happening around the U.S.

Questions or comments can be addressed in email to "elections@chicory.stanford.edu"

Important Announcements
A letter from U.S. Rep. Rush Holt (pdf), expressing concern about the lack of a voter-verified audit trail in many electronic voting machines.

A letter to the Secretary of State of California from Prof. Doug Jones, a computer scientist and election machine examiner in Iowa.

Legislation pending in Washington State!

The state of Ohio has appointed a task force to set requirements for implementing HAVA. It would be great if they required a voter-verifiable audit trail. But there don't seem to be any computer technologists on the task force. I would like to hear from Ohio residents who would can help with this issue.

News about the debate in Santa Clara County.

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